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It is widely believed that the Federal Reserve played a central role in bringing about the biggest 
catastrophe in American history—the Great Depression. The literature is extensive in seeking to 
provide an explanation for the Federal Reserve’s policy errors. This paper offers a new 
interpretation on why such an event occurred by studying a heretofore-unexamined landmark 
court case. In 1928, a private citizen filed suit against the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for 
increasing discount rates; he sough a court injunction that would force the Federal Reserve to 
decrease rates. The courts found in the System’s favor. In 1929, he appealed the case, which was 
dismissed due to a failure in enjoining the Federal Reserve Board as an indispensible party. The 
judge during the time further wrote an opinion, in which he clarified that the Board rather than 
the Banks had true authority within the Federal Reserve System. This paper looks at how these 
two decisions affected Federal Reserve policy between 1929-1933. It argues that the de-
politicization of the Federal Reserve coupled with implicit judicial sanction allowed it to act on 
its flawed ideology without fear of political recrimination. The paper also examines the impact of 
the Great Depression on the Federal Reserve’s independence today. 
 
 v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PREFACE .................................................................................................................................. VII 
1.0 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
2.0 THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S CONSTITUTIONALITY ............................................. 7 
3.0 THE TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS OF A YOUNG FED ....................................... 15 
4.0 THE LEAD-UP TO THE STOCK MARKET CRASH ............................................... 23 
5.0 PLUNGING INTO THE GREAT DEPRESSION ........................................................ 35 
6.0 A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT ....................................................................................... 43 
7.0 THE DEARTH OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE IN THE U.S. .................. 47 
8.0 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 58 
APPENDIX A ............................................................................................................................... 63 
APPENDIX B ............................................................................................................................... 66 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................ 68 
 vi 
 LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Historical Real GDP in the U.S. (logged) from 1790 to Present .................................... 2 
Figure 2: Central Bank Independence and Average Inflation (from Alesina and Summers  [1993]) ... 49 
Figure 3: Inflation Rates in the U.S. from 1900 to present .......................................................... 51 
Figure 4: Real GDP in the U.S. from 1900 to present (logged) ................................................... 52 
 vii 
PREFACE 
 
To my committee, Dr. Burnham, Dr. Husted and Dr. Rawski, and especially to my advisor Dr. 
Troesken, I would like to thank all of you for your patience, support and guidance in helping me 
complete this Bachelor of Philosophy. I would not have found this interesting case and 
fascinating legal history without my advisor, whose class I was fortuitous enough to take.  
Additionally, I would like to thank my family and friends; this thesis would not have 
been possible without their relentless encouragement and unwavering belief in me. They  
accompanied me to coffee shops, libraries and other venues and put up with me during my most 
stressful times, and for that I shall always be beholden to them. 
Finally, I would like to thank the faculty and administration at the Honors College. This 
work would not have been possible without their guidance, especially during my formative years 
at the University of Pittsburgh. They truly enriched my undergraduate experience. 
 
Dedication 
To the late Dean of the Honors College, G. Alec Stewart a.k.a “Doc.” 
Doc, thank you for entering my life when you did; you changed my thinking for the better. 
I am grateful to have known you and very much missed your presence this last year at Pitt.  
   1 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
“Ours is a land rich in resources...filled with millions of happy homes; blessed with comfort and 
opportunity... In no nation are the fruits of accomplishment more secure… I have no fears for the 
future of our country. It is bright with hope.” 
 
~Herbert Hoover, Inaugural Address, March 4, 1929, Washington D.C.1 
 
 
The above quote from President Hoover’s Inaugural Address was recorded seven months 
before the stock market crash that would rock the U.S. economy; by the end of his term in 1932, 
the United States would have been plunged into a depression that left one in every four 
unemployed and significantly reduced the nation’s wealth. From the experience of a “higher 
degree of comfort and security than ever existed before in the history of the world,” the United 
States entered a severe depression of a magnitude never experienced by the U.S. economy before 
or since.2 The graph on the following page shows the U.S. real GDP; one can see the clean, log-
linear relationship of GDP, except for the period between 1929 and 1933. Between the peak in 
1929 and the trough in 1933, real GDP had declined by about 37%.  
                                                
1 Hoover, Herbert. Inaugural Address. Washington, D.C. 4 March 1929. <http://www.hooverassociation.org/hoover/ 
speeches/inaugural_address.php> 
2 Ibid. 
3 Friedman, Milton and Anna J. Schwartz. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867 to 1960. Princeton: 
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  Figure 1: Historical Real GDP in the U.S. (logged) from 1790 to Present 
 
 
Data from: Johnston, Louis and Samuel H. Williamson, "What Was the U.S. GDP Then?" MeasuringWorth, 2010. <http://www.measuringworth.org/usgdp/>. 
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The literature on explanations for this calamity is extensive; the standard argument holds 
that money supply played a central role in exacerbating the magnitude of the recession. 
According to Friedman and Schwartz (1971), the Federal Reserve System (referred to as the 
“Fed” from here on), which had been entrusted with the authority to mitigate financial turmoil 
and ensure economic prosperity, actually caused the historically unprecedented contraction, 
which they call “a tragic testimonial to the importance of monetary forces.”3 Whether external 
factors forced the recession or it occurred because of the Fed’s policies, it is nonetheless widely 
accepted today that the Fed’s erroneous policy significantly worsened the recession, especially in 
its failure to fulfill its role as the lender of last resort.  
This has led to extensive research into the reasons for the Fed’s policy failures. In their book A 
Monetary History of the United States, 1867 to 1960, Friedman and Schwartz (1971) argue that 
the death of Governor Strong of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 1928 left a power 
vacuum within the Fed because Harrison, who replaced strong in 1928, was not a dominant 
personality and was unable to lead the Fed during its time of need. This resulted in a shift of 
power to the Board, which did not have traditions of strong leadership. They contend that this 
lack of leadership prevented the Fed from taking decisive and prompt action, as it had done in 
the 1920s under Strong; thus, policy from 1929-1933 was “passive, defensive, [and] hesitant” 
and ultimately, ineffective.4  
In A History of the Federal Reserve, Volume 1: 1913-1951, Meltzer (2003) argues that 
Strong’s death would not have been changed the outcome of policy during this time because by 
1930, the rest of the reserve banks and the Board blamed the speculation of 1928-29 on what 
                                                
3 Friedman, Milton and Anna J. Schwartz. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867 to 1960. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1971. p. 300 
4 Ibid., p. 411 
   4 
they viewed as Strong’s over-expansionary policy in 1924-27. Meltzer contends that this 
diminished the New York Bank’s standing during policy-making in the crucial years that led to 
the Great Depression; the rest of the System were unwilling to back New York’s consistently 
expansionary policy proposals yet again. Moreover, Meltzer also shows that the Fed’s policies 
during the depression were in line with the beliefs of the time and policies pursued in the 1920s. 
The belief that speculation and inflation must be followed by painful deflation in order to restore 
price stability, along with the two main policy doctrines of the time, the “real bills doctrine” and 
the “Riefler-Burgess doctrine,” caused the Fed to misread money indicators, resulting in 
erroneous policy. Additionally, Meltzer attributes the Fed’s problems to an attempt to burst a 
bubble where there might have been none, and this combined with the extreme inflation-aversion 
would not allow it to expand money sufficiently.  
In The Strategy and Consistency of Federal Reserve Monetary Policy, 1924 – 1933, 
Wheelock (1991), also finds that policy was less responsive during the depression than between 
1924-1929; however, he attributes this to the Fed’s pursuit of a single policy strategy and goal 
rather than a change in the administration, though that might have admittedly played a part. 
Because the Fed contended that low borrowing implied easy credit conditions, the officials truly 
believed they were responding to the depression sufficiently. This is also in line with the 
argument Meltzer makes in pointing out that Strong, who bought into this mistaken policy, might 
have also thought that the expansionary policy was sufficient. However, Friedman and Schwartz 
notice that the New York Bank, particularly its directors, kept pushing for open market purchases 
and expansionary policy because they had updated their policy beliefs due to their experience as 
the policy-makers of the financial stronghold.  
   5 
In this paper, I will show that the Fed’s policy mistakes stemmed not just from its flawed 
ideologies, but also due to a significant shift in the institutional arrangement that has not been 
considered by these historians. In 1928, one private citizen sued the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York for increasing discount rates; he wanted the courts to pass an injunction that would 
force the Fed to decrease rates. The courts found in favor of New York. In 1929, he appealed the 
case; the Circuit of Appeals dismissed the case because of a failure to enjoin the Federal Reserve 
Board as an indispensible party in the case. This case, Raichle v. The Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, was historic because it passed the first judicial judgment on the ability of the Fed to 
make independent policy through discount rate changes and open market operations.  
By examining the meeting minutes of the Open Market Investment Committee (OMIC), I 
will argue how the Fed derived legitimacy from this court decision to make independent policy 
without political pressure. Between 1929 and 1933, the Fed made consistently independent 
decisions, and it was deeply reluctant to coordinate policies with the government. The power 
struggle within the Fed between New York and the Board, which Friedman and Schwartz and 
Meltzer agree caused much uncertainty in 1928-29 regarding monetary policy, can be better 
explained through the framework that one body derived more legitimacy than the other from 
each of these court decisions. The first decision gave the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
legitimacy to make policy, but the second affirmed the Board’s sense that it was supreme over 
the reserve banks because of Judge Hand’s opinion. Thus, the power shift that Friedman and 
Schwartz refer to did not occur merely because of Strong’s death, but because the court decision 
upheld the Board’s responsibility to supervise the banks. 
Unfortunately, in acting from a newly affirmed sense of independence, the Fed made 
grave policy errors because of its flawed models and ideologies; it allowed money supply to fall 
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too low, plunging the U.S. into the Great Depression. This experience has scarred the Federal 
Reserve and has constrained its independence today. The paper discusses how the Federal 
Reserve in the 1950s and beyond has been swayed by political and popular sentiments and is 
actually not as independent as currently perceived. It will be argued that because of the Federal 
Reserve’s blunders in its early years, the public does not trust it to make proper policy during 
times of distress; thus, increased public attacks and congressional scrutiny causes the Board to 
give in to popular demand, which results in a feedback loop that severely compromises its 
policy-making. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the legal history that resulted in the 
constitutionality of a federal agency’s ability to print money. Section 3 describes the Federal 
Reserve System as it existed back in the 1920s; it lays out tools the System had available, 
monetary policy beliefs of the time and major problems and concerns faced by the System during 
this time. Section 4 examines policy closely in 1928 and 1929, particularly around the time the 
case was filed, decided, appealed and dismissed. Section 5 explores policy from 1930 to 1933, 
especially whether the legitimacy derived from the case might explain some of the policy 
blunders. Section 6 performs a short thought experiment to see how the Federal Reserve would 
have been shaped had the courts decided to find for the plaintiff. Section 6 examines Federal 
Reserve’s independence deficiency from 1951 to present, and the paper concludes with 
implications for the Federal Reserve’s independence in the future.   
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2.0  THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S CONSTITUTIONALITY 
A series of prior court rulings cemented the constitutionality of the Federal Reserve 
because of precedence, the idea that courts must respect prior decisions. These decisions found 
that Congress had the authority empower Federal administrative agencies, overrun state law if it 
affects national money system, and finally that national banks and their federal functions (of 
central banking) are constitutional. This section will briefly explore the legal history of money in 
the U.S. that led to these decisions. 
The First Bank of United States, and its successor the Second Bank of the United States, 
were established by Congress to handle the financial needs and requirements of the federal 
government. Though the banks were private, they held Treasury deposits, including tax revenues, 
and essentially operated as the “government’s bank.” Because of this special relationship with 
the central government, the First and Second Banks experienced greater profits due to 
preferential treatment. The First Bank’s creation was widely contested, particularly by the South, 
because of fears that it would create a money monopoly; the Bank’s charter renewal in 1811 
failed because of a general distrust of national banking institutions. However, without the First 
Bank to regulate monies during the War of 1812, severe inflation resulted, leading the same 
administration that denied the re-charter, to bring back the First Bank in the form of the Second 
Bank of the Unites States. State-charted banks resented and envied the Banks of the United 
States, and the Banks continued to be sources of political contention.  
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Congress’s ability to delegate power to federal agencies was contested and upheld in 
many cases, especially the landmark case McCulloch v. Maryland, which passed judgment on 
state interference in “central banking.”  Maryland passed a bill in 1818, which allowed the state 
to levy taxes on notes of banks not chartered in Maryland5 Maryland’s bill specifically targeted 
the Second Bank’s Baltimore branch since it was the only Bank not operating under a Maryland 
Charter that issued notes. McCulloch, the head of the Baltimore Branch, refused to pay the tax. 
The case, which was appealed to the Supreme Court, contested that Congress did not have the 
explicit authority to charter a bank, making the Bank of United States unconstitutional.  
Chief Justice Marshall found in favor of the federal government by invoking the 
“Necessary and Proper” Clause, which gives Congress the power to “make all laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers….”6 He expounded 
that firstly, Congress and the federal government held supremacy over the state government, and 
secondly, the “Necessary and Proper” Clause was not meant to be interpreted narrowly, but gave 
Congress the authority to carry out its other powers as it saw fit.7 According to this 
interpretation, though the chartering of a bank is not a specified power, Congress had the ability 
to create any administrative institution that would allow it to carry out its explicit powers. Thus, 
Maryland’s bill was declared unconstitutional, and the courts allowed Congress the authority to 
overturn state law if it affected Congress from carrying out its constitutional powers.8  
Nevertheless, resentment over the Second Bank’s operations continued, and the matter of 
the Second Bank’s constitutionality persisted, resulting in the Jacksonian banking crisis in the 
1830s and early 1840s. Andrew Jackson formed his platform for the presidential election in 1932 
                                                
5 McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
6 U.S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 18 
7 McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
8 State laws affecting the national money system fell under this category. Ibid. 
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around the removal of the Second Bank of the United States from power; he contended that a 
single national bank held too much power and caused inflation and other ills when issuing notes 
that were not properly backed by metal.9 Jackson, with his common man appeal and passionate 
attack on the corruption of rich stock-holders at the expense of the poor farmer, won the election 
and embarked on his agenda to shut down the Second Bank. In 1832, he vetoed a bill to extend 
the Bank’s charter beyond 1836, and in 1833, he officially transferred government deposits from 
the Second Bank and to various state-chartered banks, called “pet banks.”  
The Second Bank went bankrupt in 1841, but more importantly traditional historians such 
as Sumner and Schlesinger argue that his “bank war” also caused the banking panic in 1837 and 
inflation because the state banks over-issued their notes.10 They also contend that Jackson’s 
Specie Circular, an executive order issued in 1836 to only accept “specie,” i.e. notes back by 
gold and/or silver, for public land further lead to over-issuing and depreciating currency.11 
Moreover, since the Second Bank’s charter was only due to expire in 1836, it could still operate 
as the “central” bank though it did not have government deposits; in an attempt to twist 
Jackson’s arm, the Second Bank enacted some policies that attempted to arrest credit and 
banking, which led to further expansion of state-issued specie. Though economists continue to 
contend over the reasons behind the banking panic of 1837 and the subsequent contraction, 
Jackson’s “bank war” caused uncertainty within the American banking system. 
The banking panic of 1837 and the subsequent contraction from 1839-43 was one of the 
worst in American history. Friedman and Schwartz compare this contraction to the Great 
                                                
9 Hummel, Jeffrey Rogers. “The Jacksonians, Banking, and Economic Theory: A Reinterpretation.” Journal of 
Libertarian Studies. Vol. 2, No. 2. 1978. pp. 152. 
10 Ibid. p. 153 
11 Ibid. 
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Depression that followed less than a century later because of the similar money uncertainty.12 
During this time, the van Buren administration attempted to pass the Independent Treasury Act, 
which would set up an independent treasury that would be isolated from all banks; the Act finally 
passed in 1841, but was repealed one year later, leading to further uncertainties.13 Some wanted 
to establish a central bank at this time, but most still did not believe such an authority to be 
constitutional.  
The Independent Treasury system was reestablished in 1844, and sought to “divorce the 
government from all connection with the money market.”14 Government deposits were moved to 
the treasury and its branches; however, there still did not exist a national currency. The National 
Banking Act of 1863 and 1864 created a national banking system in an attempt to create an 
uniform currency and to aid in financing the civil war by issuing bank notes backed by 
government securities rather than metal.15 In 1865, Congress imposed a tax on notes issued by 
state-chartered banks, thus creating a monopoly of note issue in the newly chartered national 
banks, again in order to create a market for government bonds.16 The first common national 
notes approved by Congress were the “greenbacks,” but war efforts caused a significant portion 
of these notes to be consumed quickly. In 1862, the Legal Tender Act was passed, which allowed 
the government to print money in order to raise revenue for the Civil War without increasing 
taxes; it made the greenbacks “a legal tender of all debts, public and private, even those 
contracted before the legal tender cases were passed.”17 
                                                
12 Friedman and Schwartz (1971), p. 299. 
13 Hurst, James Willard. A Legal History of Money in the United States, 1774-1970. University of Nebraska Press. 
Lincoln. p. 194-195. 
14 Ibid. However, the Treasury’s operations continued to affect money market, which never lead to a true separation 
of state and banking as intended.  
15 Friedman and Schwartz (1971), p. 18. 
16 Hurst (1973), p. 37. 
17 Friedman and Schwartz (1971), p. 46. 
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The Legal Tender cases further questioned and upheld the authority of Congress to use 
fiat currency, or “paper” money, as the legal tender. The 1870 decision in Hepburn v. Griswold 
found the Legal Tender Act to be unconstitutional, but this decision was overturned in Knox v. 
Lee in 1871.18 Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution expressly prohibits the states from issuing 
“bills of credits” or making anything other than gold and silver coin as “legal tender.” However, 
no such restriction was placed upon the federal government’s authority. Moreover, the broad 
interpretation of the “Necessary and Proper Clause” from McCulloch v. Maryland gave Congress 
the ability to enact any law in pursuance of its specific Constitutional powers. Article 1, Section 
8 explicitly gives Congress the authority to “borrow and coin money” and “regulate the value” of 
U.S. and foreign coins. Thus, the issue in the legal-tender cases was whether fiat currency could 
be used to carry out Congress’s ability to regulate the value of currency.  
The Supreme Court ruled in the federal government’s favor, stating that Congress had the 
authority to  
reasonably decide what definitions of legal tender would best serve public interest 
and that the public interest in an effective money supply warranted applying the 
statutory definitions of legal tender even to govern agreements for payment in 
legal tender money made prior to the legislation.19 
 
Thus, the ability to issue currency was declared constitutional. The matter of delegating the 
power of coining money, which the Constitution expressly gives to Congress in Article 1 Section 
8, was also resolved by the argument that Congress still made the law, but chose agencies, like 
                                                
18 Friedman and Schwartz (1971), p. 46-47. The decision in the first case caused little stir because it was assumed 
that the decision ruled only upon the legality of the use of greenbacks for contracts made before its issue, but it soon 
became apparent that it also made the greenbacks unconstitutional for contracts entered into after the war. Thus, 
Congress pushed for a review of this matter, and an opportunity arose in 1871. 
19 Hurst (1973), p. 41-42. 
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national banks and later the Federal Reserve, to implement it.20 The federal functions of national 
banks and the constitutionality of the National Banking Act of 1864 were upheld. Since banks 
operating across state borders were considered to be constitutional, Federal Banks that would 
essentially act as clearing houses for these banks should also be constitutional.  
Following the Civil War and the approval of a common currency, there continued to be 
arguments, especially regarding bimetallism, and in 1873, Congress passed the Coinage Act, 
which demonetized silver.21 However, the legal constitutionality of the Federal Reserve’s powers 
had already been decided at this juncture. The inefficiency of the Treasury and national banking 
system before the turn of the century necessitated a central bank. The Treasury tended to rather 
sporadically grant or withhold liquid assets on which banks could base their lending.22 It was 
unable to inspire confidence in the economy. Additionally, the national banking system was rigid 
and inefficient in providing both currency and deposit-check money.23 The lack of central control 
and a central regulatory body further debilitated the banking system.  
Thus, the Fed, when it was established in 1913, was viewed as an improved body that 
could assume the powers that already existed in these various bodies. It followed from 
precedence that there exists federal power whereby the Fed could authorize the printing of 
money and conduct open market operations to regulate terms of bank credit. The Courts also 
affirmed the Fed’s regulatory authority, generally a matter within state department, in 1913.24 
Therefore, the ruling in Raichle was merely one in a string of many that affirmed the 
constitutionality of Federal Reserve powers. 
                                                
20 McC. Wright, David. “Is the Amended Federal Reserve Act Constitutional? A Study in the Delegation of Power.”  
Virginia Law Review. Vol. 23, No. 6. April 1937. pp. 629-653. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1067642>. p. 630. 
21 Friedmand and Schwartz (1971), p. 49 
22 Hurst (1973), p. 194. 
23 Ibid., p. 290. 
24 Ibid., p. 295. First National Bank of Bay City v. Fellows 244 U.S. 416 (1917). 
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However, the lack of a specific mandate with well-defined goals for monetary policy 
outcomes allows the Fed undue powers, which people argue is unconstitutional. The Federal 
Reserve had to narrow its mandate from experience according to its discretion.25 In 1923, around 
the time when the bull market took off in the stock exchange, the Fed decided to include 
“‘sound’ credit conditions” as a criterion for supplying money and justified that  
…if business is undergoing a rapid expansion and is in danger of developing an 
unhealthy or speculative boom, it should not be assisted by to easy credit 
conditions. In such circumstances the creation of additional credit should be 
discouraged by increasing the cost of that credit.26  
 
This resulted in a “moral suasion” campaign in 1928-29 when the Federal Reserve used its 
monetary authority to specifically discourage credit from entering the stock market. Frank 
Raichle, in suing the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, actually questioned the self-
determined power of the Federal Reserve in bursting market bubbles by attempting to curb the 
stock market boom. The courts, by ruling in favor of the Fed, upheld its ability to make 
independent monetary policy, but also implicitly approved of its current policy stance that 
speculation must be discouraged and inflation avoided.  
 This section considered the legal history of money and banking before the establishment 
of the Federal Reserve. Some things become apparent from this brief exploration. The first is the 
persistence of distrust of national banking institutions, particularly prevalent in the South and 
West because of their agricultural base. This would continue to play a role in the establishment 
of the Federal Reserve System. The second is the predominance of inflationary problems because 
of a lack of central authority to control money. The courts have played a predominant in role in 
determining the authority of a national agency to print money, and the path was thus paved for 
                                                
25 McC. Wright (1937), p. 637. 
26 McC. Wright (1937), p. 637. Original Source: Federal Reserve Annual Report for the year 1923, p. 10. 
   14 
the existence of a central bank, but because of this distrust of one strong bank, the result was the 
Federal Reserve System. 
   15 
3.0  THE TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS OF A YOUNG FED 
Following the banking panic of 1907, Congress recognized the need for a “central” bank 
to control the seasonal expansion of credit and serve as a lender of last resort, but the Democrats 
distrusted a truly central authority that would put the interests of a financial industry before 
agricultural and real business interests.27 The Democrats gained control of Congress, and the 
Federal Reserve System took the form of a system of twelve Reserve Banks that could 
independently establish policy with a Federal Reserve Board that would supervise them and 
coordinate policy. It was a compromise between public and private ownership. Each Reserve 
Bank consisted of a Board of Directors comprised of bankers, who recommended policy; the 
Chairman of the Bank (more commonly referred to as the Governor) would transmit these 
recommendations to the Board, whose five members were politically appointed. The Board’s 
Chairman would rotate on an yearly basis; the Board had the ability to (dis)approve the 
recommended policy. Apart from this, a committee of bankers made up the Federal Advisory 
Council that would advise the Board on policy decisions. 
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 established a “scientific federal banking system” that 
would create a more uniform monetary policy across the country and prevent the 
                                                
27 Johnson, Roger. “Historical Beginnings…The Federal Reserve.” Public and Community Affairs Department. The 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. December, 1999. <http://www.bos.frb.org/about/pubs/begin.pdf>. 
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overexpansion.28 However, the actual act was vague in terms of the central bank’s mandate. The 
only explicit constraint on the Federal Reserve’s ability to conduct policy was the order to only 
discount those bills arising out of “actual commercial transaction,” not those merely covering 
investments.29 The act also called upon the Federal Reserve to adhere to the gold standard and 
make policy accordingly.30 This open-endedness created much confusion during the Federal 
Reserve’s early years as it attempted to make policy. 
The act also did not clearly draw the lines of authority between the Board and the 
Reserve Banks. The original federalist system of central banking diffused the command of the 
Board, but the Board built its authority through a desire for uniformity. The Reserve Banks 
generally deferred to the Board regarding policy, resulting in slight divergences, but on the 
occasions of conflict, the reserve banks saw that the authority to make discount rate decisions 
rested with them because the intent behind the comprised bill was a decentralized system. In the 
1920s, the struggle for supremacy between the Board and the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York became apparent as the Board stepped up its efforts to take control of the System.   
The System’s main policy-making tool at this time was discounting; the reserve banks 
had the ability to change discount rates, which impacted the member banks’ ability to borrow 
from the central bank, and acceptance rates (also referred to as buying rate and bills rate), which 
was the rate at which one could buy bank acceptances. Additionally the reserve banks could also 
conduct open market operations, which involved buying and selling bank acceptances, bills of 
                                                
28 Raichle v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 34 F. 2d 910 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).  
29 Federal Reserve Act. 12 U.S.C. Ch. 6. Pub.–No. 43.–63d Congress. § 13 (1913). p. 264. 
<http://home.hiwaay.net/~ becraft/FedResAct.pdf>. 
30 Ibid. § 26. p. 274. “Nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to repeal the parity provision or provisions 
contained in an Act approved March fourteenth, nineteen hundred, entitled ‘An Act to define and fix the standard of 
value, to maintain the parity of all forms of money issued or coined by the United States, to refund the public debt, 
and for other purposes.’ This refers to the Act that established the gold standard. 
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exchange and so forth, but would expand in the 1920s to include government securities as well.31 
The Banks also had the additional authority of making gold transactions. 
In establishing an authority that essentially assumed preexisting powers and functions 
from national banks, the Fed had to firmly demonstrate its authority in order to discourage a 
market analogy of shared power.32 The act required national banks to become members of the 
Federal Reserve System, and many thought they could collude with the reserve banks for their 
benefit. However, the System quickly dispelled such notions and solidified its authority over 
member banks, first by adjusting the general credit situation without waiting for applications 
from member banks for loans or rediscounts, and by rejecting the notion that “the [Federal 
Reserve] banks were legally bound to rediscount eligible paper whenever a member tendered it,” 
as the bankers insisted.33 This sufficiently divorced the Fed from the banking industry, and gave 
it supremacy in conducting monetary policy.  
The Federal Reserve began operations in 1914 during World War I. Immediately 
following its establishment, the Federal Reserve found itself catering to the Treasury’s demands 
because of the war and “became subservient to the Treasury’s perceived needs.”34 The System 
sacrificed its independence to finance Treasury bond sales and lower the cost of debt finance, but 
found itself facing the unpleasant task of lowering wartime inflation. According to the belief of 
the time, deflation following inflation was “inevitable” in order to force prices to adjust, which 
implied that wartime inflation must be followed by painful readjustment. Additionally, the 
European powers abandoned the gold standard to finance the war, and the US banned the export 
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of gold, but the central bankers expressed the desire to return to the gold standard once again, 
even if it required the forceful deflation of the currency.35  
With this in mind, the System raised interest rates sharply in 1920-21, which resulted in 
deflation, a sharp decline in industrial and agricultural production and a rapid increase in 
unemployment.36 The hardships caused by falling prices and high interest rates in many member 
banks particularly incensed the South and West. Within a few years of its operations, the Federal 
Reserve appeared to have acted exactly in the way Congress and the public had feared: its policy 
in 1920-21 favored the banking industry at the expense of the agricultural sector. Though 
Congress initially supported the Fed’s policy of progressive rates (penalizing banks that 
borrowed more from its reserve banks), public outrage grew over high rates, particularly in the 
agricultural areas.37  
While Meltzer argues that the public outrage during this time stemmed more from “the 
background of hostility to high interest rates in the South and West” than from the actual 
economic hardships, but the public outrage deeply affected the Fed.38 The System was facing 
political pressure just when it was trying to become independent of the Treasury and the political 
system. Though evidence shows that the Fed might have kept interest rates too high for too long, 
which prolonged the recession, political fervor tipped the scales in favor of lower discount rates 
when the System itself was vacillating over policy.  
The young System continued to suffer further consequences of its actions in 1920-21. A 
flurry of Congressional activity sought to contain the central bank’s independence, including 
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Phelan Act. (p. 105). 
38 Meltzer (2003), p. 131. 
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hearings and a proposal in 1921 to restrict the Federal Reserve’s ability to increase discount 
levels above a certain ceiling without congressional approval.39 Though this proposal never 
passed, Congress and the public became preoccupied with price stability over other concerns in 
the 1920s.40 These concerns are reflected in the congressional hearings held throughout the 
decade (in 1922-23, 1926-27 and 1928) to set price stability as an explicit and main policy goal. 
Though the deflation that started in 1920 had ended by 1922, the political backlash 
shaped the Federal Reserve’s policy throughout the 1920s, particularly the Board’s reluctance in 
1928-29 to raise interest rates above 6% during the stock market boom.41 More importantly, it 
also impacted the Federal Reserve’s policy stance. The System saw this period as an opportunity 
to preserve and re-establish its independence. When the committee organized to carry out a 
congressional inquiry over the high interest rates recognized that the Federal Reserve was “most 
at fault when it yielded to Treasury pressure during the summer and fall of 1919” and the System 
“should have been more concerned about inflation and less concerned about Treasury refunding 
operations,” the System’s main policy preference had been formed.42 The consequences of its 
policies had created popular and political support for stable prices. Thus, the Federal Reserve’s 
concerns over speculative excesses, reluctance to expand policy due to fears of inflation, and the 
agenda to re-establish the gold standard all revolved around price stability. Without inflation the 
“inevitable” deflation need not follow, which the Federal Reserve found desirable in order to 
preserve its independence.  
                                                
39 Meltzer (2003), p. 127. 
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The other development that occurred as a result of the threat to its independence was the 
establishment of the Open Market Investment Committee (OMIC) in 1922; open market 
purchases/sales of government securities became the main means of controlling money supply. 
Though its discovery was accidental, the System increasingly relied on purchase and sales of 
government securities to make policy because it could contract the money supply without facing 
the political heat of high discount rates.43 This allowed the Federal Reserve to further maintain 
its independence, but it also increased the importance of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
With Governor Strong of New York steering the OMIC, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
and Strong assumed tremendous power. Furthermore, the five members of the OMIC were able 
to make policy without Board approval, which the Board believed had violated the compromise 
behind the Federal Reserve Act since the bankers had now effectively taken control of central 
banking. The Board struggled throughout the decade to take back the authority it believed to be 
rightfully its own from New York and the OMIC.  
The 1920-21 deflation and the 1923 recession also caused ideologies to diverge, which 
further heightened tensions between the Board and the New York Bank. New York adopted what 
Meltzer calls the “Riefler-Burgess doctrine,” which contended that open market policy was more 
effective than discount rates and should be employed first before discount rate changes were 
made.44 The premise of the doctrine was the belief that banks are reluctant to borrow at discount 
windows because it is a penalty rate; they want to decrease their borrowing when possible. Thus, 
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the proponents of this policy relied on member banks’ borrowing and the market interest rate as 
the proper measure of the effectiveness of monetary policy.45  
The ideology favored by the Board, and in fact by Congress during this time, is the “real 
bills doctrine,” which contended that the Federal Reserve should monitor the use of credit, 
particularly by discouraging the use of credit for speculative purposes because it “diverted” 
credit from real business activities and production.46 As mentioned earlier, the Federal Reserve 
Act explicitly calls upon the reserve banks to only discount real bills and placed injunctions 
against the use of credit for speculation. Proponents of this ideology, which included most 
economists of the time, believed that if credit expanded with business (by supporting it), it would 
not lead to inflation, but credit used for speculative purposes would.  
Though both schools agreed that speculation was harmful, they differed in their response 
to it. The Riefler-Burgess side, led by Strong and New York, contended that policy should focus 
on controlling the quantity of credit because the Fed could not control how the credit is used 
once it leaves the discount window.47 However, the “real bills” side believed that the Federal 
Reserve could and should influence the quality of credit because harming real business in an 
effort to discourage some banks from supporting speculative endeavors was undesirable. These 
differences combined with the lack of clear distinction regarding the authority of the Board over 
the reserve banks lead to a lack of direction within the System during 1928-29 and beyond. 
The existing threat to its independence in the 1920s caused an aversion within the 
System, particularly the Board, to high interest rates “that had damaged agriculture and 
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commerce and heightened criticism of the System.”48 By seeking to preserve its independence, 
the Fed actually acted according to popular sentiment of the time by fixing price stability and 
inflation-aversion as its primary goal. However, the System also had the contradictory policy 
goal of avoiding increases in discount rates. Initially, this goal of avoiding increases in discount 
rates (and facilitating the establishment of the gold standard) dominated the System’s 
preferences. When the economy was booming in 1927-28, the Federal Reserve should have 
increased rates sooner (as New York proposed throughout 1928), but fear of political reprisal 
dominated the fear of potential inflation, so the Board refused, relying instead on “direct action.”   
Examined against this political environment, the court case in 1928 is particularly 
enlightening. A private citizen takes the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to court for 
increasing discount rates because high interest rates were particularly reactionary during this 
time period. However, he came from an investment point of view; he contended that the Federal 
Reserve had no call to curb the stock market boom and discourage speculation. The following 
section examines this case (and its subsequent appeal in 1929) and its effect on policy in1928-
1929. 
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4.0  THE LEAD-UP TO THE STOCK MARKET CRASH 
In 1927, stock prices rose though the US was in a recession. The increase in stock prices meant 
that credit was already sufficiently loose, so the System had to decide between tightening and 
expanding money. Strong wanted lower rates, partly because of international cooperation to 
preserve the gold standard (the British sterling needed strengthening), but also to alleviate 
hardships during the recession.49 However, neither the Board nor the Advisory Council wanted 
to allow money expansion because they did not want to add to the already inflationary 
sentiments.50 The System followed Strong’s suggestion of expansionary policy, and in the 
summer of 1927, it increased open market purchases and decreased discount rates.51  
By 1928, financial activity was booming, and the general opinion within the System was 
that the growth of bank credit was “more rapid than required” and could not be continued.52 On 
January 12, the OMIC voted to sell government securities to tighten money because the newly 
created credit had been diverted into “channels of investment and speculation.”53 However, the 
increase in broker loans by its next meeting in the end of March indicated to the System that 
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credit continued to be for speculative purposes. This led to the conclusion that the 4% discount 
rate was not as affective in curbing the speculative appetite; the System decided to sell more 
securities during the following month to tighten credit further.54 Throughout April and May, 
concerns over speculation had not abated because of the continued increase in broker loans. The 
System was still dissatisfied with the expansion of bank credit, which it stated had manifested 
itself mostly through loans extended on stocks and bonds. 55 All reserve banks increased discount 
rates, and the OMIC continued to sell securities and acceptances in the open market. Between the 
end of April and July 13, discount rates had increased by 100 basis points (bps) to 5%.56  
On August 4, 1928, Frank G. Raichle, a private citizen and owner of some stocks and 
bonds, filed a case against the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for “[a]rtificial stringency! 
Propaganda! Money despotism! Paternalism!” and accused the Federal Reserve Bank of being 
“illegally engaged in the arbitrary reduction of business through the fixing of high rediscount 
rates.”57 His official charge stated the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s wrongful spreading 
of propaganda about an alleged money shortage, attempting to restrict supply of credit available 
for investment purposes, and raising the rediscount rate for member banks. He claimed that in 
pursuing these detrimental policies, the New York Bank caused the prices of his stocks and 
bonds to fall, thereby depriving him of his property without due process, thus violating his Fifth 
Amendment rights.58 The case was filed under the District Court of United States for Southern 
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District of New York, and following a trial, the courts found in favor of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York on November 6, 1928.  
Immediately following the filing of the suit, the idea of “seasonal crop marketing paper,” 
which would discount agricultural loans at lower rates, emerged; the Board pushed for this, but 
the OMIC objected to this idea, and this proposal was rejected. Nevertheless, this was the first 
response of the Board to the filing of the suit, and there is a definite sense that the System was 
suddenly uncomfortable with the high rates and tight policy. At this meeting on August 13, the 
OMIC stated that purchases might be necessary to prevent “any unwholesome restriction of 
credit.”59 No changes were made to the discount rates or to the System’s account at this meeting, 
but the mood had definitely changed. The money conditions in the end of September and 
October were easier, broker loans increased, and on October 26, New York felt that due to an 
increase in bill holdings, the pressure on speculative credit had been relieved, which was 
contrary to the System’s goal at the beginning of the year.60 However, on the November 13th 
meeting of the OMIC, following the court decision, concerns over stock market speculation were 
once again raised, and all of the Governors in the committee urged the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York to “increase its buying rates for bills of all maturities by 1/8 of 1% in the near 
future.”61  
Though the case is not explicitly mentioned in the meeting minutes of the OMIC, it 
appears to have halted the Federal Reserve’s restrictive policy for a few months. The System felt 
the rumblings of discontent over high rates and immediately proposed possible purchases and a 
policy of “differential discounting” that would prevent another political backlash like in the early 
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1920s. Since the case was also filed during crop season and the System always made more 
money available during this time, it is possible this fact, rather than the case, dictated policy. 
However, after the court ruled in favor of New York, Governors at other reserve banks 
immediately asked New York to increase buying rates, which is a little too coincidental to 
ignore, suggesting that the case must have had some psychological impact on the System.  
Moreover, New York emerged from this decision feeling more independent of political 
pressures because of a reaffirming of its legitimacy and independence. While it is true that New 
York always had always been more independent, this was a New York Bank under Harrison, 
who was described as more diplomatic and conciliatory.62 The 1928 case did not have the same 
impact on the Board that it did on New York because from the Board’s perspective, just when it 
had started tightening money in the beginning of 1928 through interest rate hikes, the System 
immediately faced criticism. Though it wasn’t an outraged public or Congress, a private citizen 
taking a Reserve Bank to court was still an expression of displeasure. This immediately caused 
the Board to employ “direct action” and other softer measures in 1929 as a way to discourage 
speculation. Thus, the heightened power struggle in 1929 between the Board and the New York 
Bank must be examined within this framework. 
In the beginning of 1929, the Federal Reserve faced the same problem that it faced in 
1928 of “checking any unnecessary expansion of credit without, if possible, seriously penalizing 
business.”63  On January 21st New York increased buying rates of bills. In February, the Board 
launched its Moral Suasion campaign, whereby it directly asked its member banks to stop 
discounting loans that were used towards speculative ends. At the February 5th meeting, New 
                                                
62 Meltzer (2003), p. 195. 
63 Open Market Investment Committee. Developments During 1929: Excerpts from the Federal Reserve Open 
Market Investment Committee during 1929. Federal Reserve Archival System for Economic Research. 
<http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ historicaldocs/542/download/7472/1929.pdf>. p. 266. 
   27 
York and the other reserve banks discussed the necessity of increasing rediscount rates in the 
near future, but the Board made it clear that it preferred direct action to discount rate increases.64 
On February 14, the Directors of New York voted for a 6% rediscount rate, but the Board denied 
this action.65 Between mid-February and early August, New York requested to increase discount 
rates on nine different occasions, but the Board denied every single request.  
All of these requests were actually made before the end of May, and a frustrated letter 
from New York to the Board on May 31st read as follows: 
It is the belief of the directors of this bank that the Federal Board policy of 
seeking the control of credit without an increase in the discount rate and otherwise 
as generally understood, has created much uncertainty throughout the country, 
and that the bringing of the Federal Reserve Board and this bank into harmony 
with respect to a program which will remove uncertainty is essential to the 
restoration of confidence…66 
 
In June and July, the directors of New York chose not to increase rates because they 
wanted to make harmonious policy, but they clarified that their position had not changed; interest 
rates needed to be increased as soon as possible.67 Again, during these months, New York was 
ready to take the risk of public wrath, but the Board refused to do so because it still feared 
political backlash. 
Raichle appealed his case on May 17th, 1929 and hearings resumed on May 21st. This 
time, his claims were more explicitly reported: he had suffered property loss in excess of $3000 
due to the policies pursued by New York and the System more generally.68 Because they had 
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restricted the supply of credit available for investment purposes and had sought to control 
member banks through direct action, he argued that he had been forced to pay high interest rates 
and had the value of his property depreciated without due process of law.69 He wanted the courts 
to issue an injunction preventing the System from taking any action in order to forcefully 
liquidate broker loans. The Wall Street Journal observed that the “real issue before the court 
appears to be whether the courts may pass upon the acts and decisions of the Reserve system 
when such acts and decisions have been lawfully made but possibly with mistaken judgment.”70 
The Board appeared to be the only body within the System that was extremely averse to 
increases in discount rates at this juncture. The Federal Advisory Council advised the Board to 
approve rate increases on two separate occasions, once in April and once on May 21, just as 
hearings on Raichle’s appeal had resumed. On April 24, the Board explained to New York that 
increasing discount rates would be a “confession of the inability of the System to deal with a 
limited number of member banks who are misusing its facilities other than by imposing the 
penalty of increased rates upon the entire banking and business structure of the country.”71 At 
this time, direct action/moral suasion was a legitimate policy tool according to the real bills 
proponents, but New York was skeptical because it followed the Riefler-Burgess school.  
However, on June 5 the Board changed its position and stated that if after easing money, 
there was a return to speculation, only then “ [was] a rate increase justified, perhaps several 
increases….”72 On June 13 the Board also decided that a “temporary suspension of a rigid policy 
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of direct pressure” was in order.73 Again, once the case hearings had resumed, the Board backed 
down from its (relatively) hard line of discouraging speculation; before it denied rate increases 
because it did not want to admit that its policies were ineffective, but in June the Board denied 
the increases because of niggling doubts that perhaps it was being too harsh on the economy. 
New York disagreed, but compromised with the Board that if, for any reason, there was a 
demand for credit for speculative purposes, “the remedy of increased discount rates should be 
applied promptly and rigorously…”74  
These developments show that the New York Bank was much more confident of its 
policies than the Board, though the Board asserted its position more firmly. The latter can be 
attributed to the power struggle between the Board and New York, and the lack of strong 
leadership under Harrison. The reserve bank and the Federal Advisory Council, made up of 
bankers predominantly, appear to have shrugged off the political recriminations of the past few 
years, but the Board was excessively influenced by fear. It is only when Judge Hand dismissed 
Raichle’s case on July 15th because of a failure to enjoin the members of the Federal Reserve 
Board as indispensible parties to the case (Raichle only charged the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York and the System generally), that the Board found the confidence to ignore fears of 
political backlash. 
At the meeting on August 2 with the Board, Harrison felt that discount rates should be 
increased, but acceptance rates should be decreased; the reserve banks believed that such a 
policy would disabuse people of misusing the Federal Reserve’s credit facilities, but the lower 
acceptance rate would still release some funds.75 On August 8, New York carried out these 
                                                
73 Ibid., p. 320. 
74 Open Market Investment Committee (1929), p. 322. 
75 Ibid., p. 329. 
   30 
policies following Board approval. Finally, after nine rejections, the Board approved an increase 
in discount rates. Harrison meant the lowering of acceptance rates to be a bargaining technique 
that would convince the Board to approve the discount rate increase, but the Board’s approval 
should be attributed to the dismissal of Raichle’s case rather than this possible bargaining 
technique because of the shift in its position. In a Bulletin issued on August 1929, the Board 
mentioned the unusual importance of the case and quoted Hand’s opinion that “if it proceeds in 
good faith through open-market operations and control of discount rates to bring about a 
reduction of brokers’ loans, it commits no legal wrong.”76 This definitely gave the Board the 
approval it needed to make policy as it saw fit. 
At the September meeting of the OMIC, the committee members found that Federal 
Reserve credit had increased, but more worrisome was the continued expansion of broker loans 
because the increase in discount rates had no impact on call or money rates.77 One month later, 
the stock market was in distress, with Black Thursday on October 24, and Black Tuesday on 
October 29. Ironically, when New York asked for a reduction in discount rates and increase in 
purchases, the Board denied this motion, but allowed a reduction in acceptance rates. According 
to Meltzer, this is in accordance with the real bills doctrine because this decrease in acceptance 
rates could help real bills.78 On October 28, when New York requested another decrease in 
buying rates due to the sudden decrease in broker loans, the Board responded that “no further 
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reduction in the bill rate should be made at this time as easing program of the System seems to 
be progressing satisfactorily.”79  
The following day, Harrison and New York took matters into their own hands and 
purchased securities worth $115,000,000 without Board approval. Friedman and Schwartz 
commended New York for this decisive action and found that the Federal Reserve reacted 
appropriately only to this first shock of the five experienced between 1929 and 1933.80  At the 
time, however, the Board resented this “rogue” action and ordered New York to suspend 
purchases and decrease discount rates instead.81 On November 7th, Harrison urged more 
purchases of securities, but the Board, still seething over Harrison’s temerity to make purchases 
without approval, was no longer willing to listen. 
In his opinion given at Raichle v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Hand states that the 
Board was specifically empowered “to regulate open market transactions, review and determine 
rates of discount… [and the reserve bank] is a governmental agency under the direction of the 
Federal Reserve Board.”82 Thus, the Board rightfully must have felt that New York had 
overstepped its bounds, especially given the preexisting power struggle between the OMIC and 
the Board. On November 14, the Board approved another reduction in the discount rates to 4.5% 
and a reduction in the bills rate to 4%. The mood at the end of the year seemed to be quite 
congratulatory; the System felt they had been successful in stopping the speculative excesses 
because the stock market had quieted down, but Harrison warned that money should not be 
                                                
79 Open Market Investment Committee (1929), p. 356. 
80 Friedman and Schwartz (1971), p. 391. 
81 Ibid., p. 359. On November 5, the Board passed a resolution that no Federal Reserve Bank could buy papers of 
maturity greater than 15 days to curb New York’s actions. 
82 Learned Hand. Raichle v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  p. 6. 
   32 
tightened, and perhaps even purchases were necessary in 1930 to ease the credit for real business 
purposes.83  
The System for the most part handled the post stock market crash well, especially given 
the beliefs of the time. Meltzer notes that in 1928-29, the situation was actually deflationary, not 
inflationary as everyone had assumed because of the increase in stock prices.84 Though the rates 
could have been lowered substantially, the Board was unwilling to do so because historically 
rates such as 0.25% had never existed; the System truly felt it had done enough and a crisis was 
averted.  
The reaction of the System during and immediately following the stock market crash 
seems to violate the claim made in this paper that following the second decision, the Board 
became more confident of its ability to conduct policy. If this were indeed the case, the fact that 
New York proposed rate decreases instead of the Board, might indicate that the Board was 
indeed overcautious as before. However, this should be evaluated against the context of the time. 
As mentioned earlier, reducing acceptance rates would be the proper course of action under the 
real bills doctrine, which the Board (and the politicians of the time) supported; however, New 
York was much more attuned to credit quantity because of the Riefler-Burgess doctrine. Some of 
the decisions made also had nothing to do with feelings of legitimacy, but feelings of animosity 
between Young, the Chairman of the Board, and Harrison. Finally, the Board had abandoned 
direct action, which was a soft measure it had adopted fearing more criticism.85 These actions 
support the argument that the Board had emerged stronger following the Raichle case.   
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Meltzer finds that though the Board was in favor of more purchases, OMIC does not do 
anything further in November; New York was willing to sit back because the upward pressure on 
interest rates had declined.86 However, the alternate explanation is that New York made one last 
independent attempt in purchasing securities worth $115 million in one day, and it was not 
willing to anger the Board anymore, particularly when the law had come down on the side of the 
Board and listed the reserve banks as mere “governmental agencies.” This explains New York’s 
unwillingness to step in and further anger the Board, and also explains why the Directors at New 
York were unable to push their expansionary agenda in 1930.  
The other significant reason was the diffusion of New York’s power in conducting the 
System’s open market operations. In 1930, the Board finally replaced the five member OMIC 
with the Open Market Policy Conference, which included the Governors of all the Reserve 
Banks and the Board. This is yet another change that indicates the shift in power to the Board 
that Friedman and Schwartz mention, but it was not entirely due to Strong’s death and Harrison’s 
passivity, as they argue, but rather the Board’s increased legitimacy resulting from the court 
decision.  
In The Fifteenth Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board for the period ending in 
December 31, 1928, the Board notes that the “most important points involved in the case were 
whether a Federal Reserve Bank or the Federal Reserve System generally is authorized to 
exercise its discretion in fixing rediscount rates.”87 In The Sixteenth Annual Report of the 
Federal Reserve Board for the period ending in December 31, 1929, it states that  
[t]he opinion of the Circuit of Appeals is of unusual importance because it 
contains the first recorded judicial interpretation of the Federal Reserve Act 
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December 31, 1928. Washington, D.C. : United States Government Printing Office, 1929. p. 40. 
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dealing with the discretion of the Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal Reserve 
Board with respect to fixing rediscount rates.88   
 
Where the 1928 report only mentioned the Banks and the System in general, Hand listing the 
Board as an indispensible party changed the language in the 1929 report.  
In 1929, following the court’s decision, the Los Angeles Times bitterly reported that the 
Federal Reserve would continue to keep its grip and stated that “no semigovernment [sic] board 
or institution in the United Stated had more power than the Federal reserve, with the possible 
exception of the United States Supreme Court.”89 Furthermore, the ruling in Raichle effectively 
gave “judicial sanction to the assumption by the Board of the power to allocate credit between 
industry and finance.”90 The courts determined that the Federal Reserve’s powers included the 
authority to monitor financial markets and burst bubbles where it perceives them. However, the 
Federal Reserve’s moral suasion campaign and attempts to starve the stock market affected 
industry and the real economy.91 In the spring of 1929, various signs indicated that the American 
economy was slowing; steel production declined, construction was sluggish and car sales 
waned.92 The stock market peaked in September, a mere six weeks after the court’s ruling. The 
stock market crashed a few weeks afterwards in October 1929.  
 
                                                
88 The Federal Reserve Board. The Sixteenth Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board for the period ending 
December 31, 1929. Washington, D.C. : United States Government Printing Office, 1930. p. 36. 
89 Sinclair, John F. “Reserve Board Keeps Grip: Injunction Restraining Enforcement of Rediscount Rates Denied in 
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90 McC. Wright, David. “Is the Amended Federal Reserve Act Constituitional? A Study in the Delegation of Power.”  
Virginia Law Review. Vol. 23, No. 6. April 1937. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1067642>. p. 639. 
91 Ibid. 
92 “A Selected Wall Street Chronology.” The Crash of 1929. Prod. Ellen Hovde and Muffie Meyer. The American 
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5.0  PLUNGING INTO THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
This section examines how things spiraled out of control in the years 1930-33, 
particularly because of the Board’s newfound independence. The general sentiment at the 
beginning of 1930 was the belief that the crisis had been averted; the System recognized that the 
country was headed toward a recession, but believed that money-easing policies of November 
1929 were sufficient. Again, this stemmed from the belief of the time that a recession was 
inevitable, especially when it followed speculative excesses. Nevertheless in March 1930, the 
Board accepted a reduction in bills rate and rediscount rate at New York, and approved of open 
market purchases. However, a month later, the Board felt that further expansion of money should 
be halted. During these months, the Directors of New York strongly felt that policy should be 
expansionary because “in their opinion it would be unfortunate if the banking system could not 
be used to facilitate recovery.”93 The Board approved small purchases, but interestingly, though 
New York was for expansionary policy, other bank governors did not want to take any action 
during the time. 
Differences of opinion also emerged between the Directors of the New York Bank and 
Harrison. The Directors believed that the priority of the System should be to bring down money 
rates to more reasonable levels. However, the other members of the System felt that since 
purchases had not affected long-term interest rates, it actually could not do so, and they opposed 
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this proposal because that would only result in “useless” expansion and inflation down the road. 
Opinion was so divided and heated that New York at one point considered withdrawing from the 
OMPC. Harrison dissuaded the Directors from doing so, but he was also unable to convince the 
OMPC that securities should be purchased.94 This incident shows that New York could not 
handle the extra restrictions the Board had placed upon it and was not happy under the new 
structure put in place by the authoritative Board.  
By September 1930, the dominant opinion in the System was that open market purchases 
and easy money had failed to revive the economy. In October, the New York directors once 
again urged Harrison to propose purchases, but he failed to do so because he, like the others at 
the Federal Reserve, blamed their current problems on Strong’s excessive expansionary policy in 
1926-27.95 In November and December, banks started failing; Friedman and Schwartz call this 
round of failures the First Banking Crisis, which they argue is the second shock experienced by 
the economy during the period 1929-33.96 In the first two weeks of December, New York 
independently made significant purchases in the open market and reduced rates in response to the 
failure of the Bank of United States, a medium-sized member bank.97 Both actions were taken 
without Board approval. The System, excluding New York, saw no responsibility towards the 
bank failures because 80% of the failures were in non-member banks, and the few member banks 
that failed were attributed to bad management that could/should not be corrected by central bank 
actions.98 
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During the December meeting of the OMPC, the Conference chastised New York for 
“temporarily exceed[ing] its authority by purchasing more securities than the conference had 
authorized.”99 The System now expressed wishes to make open market sales, though the New 
York directors disagreed. These wishes appear to have been made with the intent of reversing 
New York’s policy. In the past, when New York had taken such independent moves, the Board 
and System in general merely looked for a way to go forward and make more cohesive policy, 
but now, the others, particularly the Board, were no longer willing to tolerate such “rogue” 
behavior because it smacked of insubordination. 
At the start of 1931, the first round of bank failures had halted, and the Fed once again 
started contracting money. Though a couple of members of the Board did believe that policy 
should be expansionary, this advice was not heeded. In January, New York directors once again 
tried to convince Harrison to continue “easy policy” or at the very least, not make sales, but 
Harrison did not do so. In March 1931, the third shock hit the economy through another wave of 
bank failures, the Second Banking Crisis, which had a more severe effect on the money stock.100 
Six months later, when Harrison proposed purchases, Young, now the Governor of Boston, 
objected. However, in July, at the urging of Meyer, the current Board Chairman, the System 
made moderate purchases of $30,000,000.101  
In August 1931, the New York directors approved bill purchases on the reserve bank’s 
own account, and though Harrison and Meyer pushed for further purchases in the System’s 
account, the OMPC ruled that no immediate purchases were necessary, much to the Board’s 
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Harrison’s sudden desire to purchase securities was because of the foreign situation, not any change in his policy 
stance on the domestic situation.  
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disappointment. Following this meeting, the Board changed organization by asking to meet with 
the OMPC before it had made its final recommendation, rather than after as had been 
traditionally done.102 This is yet another example of the Board’s increasing leadership within the 
Fed because by meeting before the Conference made its recommendation, it had a better chance 
of influencing the final decision. The Board at this time also pushed its agenda by only 
approving up to $120,000,000 worth of purchases (but no sales), in order to prevent the OMPC 
from further tightening the money, yet another strong signal of the Board exerting its supremacy 
over the reserve banks, something that might not have occurred without the court decision in 
1929. 
In September 1931, Britain abandoned the gold standard, which is the fourth shock to the 
money stock, according to Friedman and Schwartz.103 Britain’s action led to a speculative frenzy 
and conversion of U.S. dollars to gold in September and October, due to fears that the U.S. 
would similarly abandon the gold standard; gold stock declined and the outflow of gold put 
further pressure on bank reserves. The Fed’s response to this particular shock was vigorous and 
prompt; on October 9, New York increased discount rates to 2.5% and in another week to 3.5%, 
the sharpest hike in history before and since.104 This caused more bank failures in the U.S. The 
Fed’s response to this external drain is not surprising, particularly given its agenda throughout 
the 1920s of maintain the gold standard and preventing inflation. This event had an appropriate 
policy response, which the Fed knew and carried out.  
Meanwhile, during these tough times, the Hoover administration attempted to cope with 
the lack of monetary easing by enacting fiscal measures. In 1931, Congress established the 
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National Credit Corporation (NCC), which was a consortium of the largest banks who could 
make loans available to the smaller banks in order to be able to meet the demands of panicking 
depositors; since these large banks were expected to make loans available on collateral not 
ordinarily acceptable, the NCC and voluntarism failed.105 In January of 1932, Congress set up 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), which was an independent agency that had the 
authority to extend loans to banks and other financial institutions as well as railroads.106 The 
Glass-Steagall Act, passed in February 1932, attempted to increase borrowing from reserve 
banks by broadening the collateral the Fed could hold against Federal Reserve notes and 
widening the circumstances under which individual banks could borrow from the system.107 
Though there was support in Congress for government expenditures and monetary expansion, if 
only through fiscal measures, the “proposals were widely castigated by the business and financial 
community as ‘greenbackism’ and ‘inflationary.’108 
In January 1932, the New York directors continued to urge open market purchases, and 
Harrison urged the OMPC to make purchases as part of a national program to expand credit and 
support the Treasury; though the OMPC approved of purchases up to $200,000,000, no 
purchases were made.109 This again illustrates the Fed’s heightened independence during this 
time because it no long felt the need to immediately capitulate to congressional demands.  
Finally in April, the Fed began modest purchases after the congressional threat to its 
independence had become too high. Congress had basically indicated that if the System would 
proceed towards monetary expansion more vigorously, no congressional action would take place. 
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However, the failure to do so might have resulted in the passage of a bill that would have 
essentially directed the Fed to make open market purchases until wholesale prices had risen to 
their 1926 level.110 Thus, the System carried out purchases of $500,000,000 for five weeks 
starting on April 12. In May, the OMPC voted to extend the program for another $500 million, 
but it reduced the weekly rate of purchase. The Fed was reluctant to carry out policy 
recommended by Congress because it believed would they would lead to inflation; it slows down 
purchases even though “the danger of unsound credit proposals [was] still great.”111 On July 16, 
Congress adjourns, which freed the Fed from congressional pressures; between August 10 and 
the end of 1932, the System’s account holding remained unchanged.112 
Another indication of the Fed’s heightened independence is its refusal to cooperate with 
the fiscal measures enacted by Congress. The Emergency Relief and Construction Act of July 
1932 permitted the Reserve Banks to discount for individuals, partnerships, and corporations, 
“with no other sources of funds, notes, drafts and bills of exchange eligible for discount for 
member banks.”113 However, the Fed did not exercise these powers because it felt they were 
inflationary, again evidence of how depoliticized the Fed had become, especially in contrast to 
the 1920s. The Federal Home Loan Bank Act was also passed in July 1932 to cope with problem 
of frozen assets of home financing institutions; it allowed federal home loan banks to make 
advances to institutions on the security of first mortgages they held.114 However, these fiscal 
maneuverings did not have much success without monetary policy support. In the last quarter of 
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1932, banks once again started failing.115 In the 1932 elections, Roosevelt won and Hoover had 
to contend with lame-duck presidency until March, which led to further policy confusions. 
At the start of 1933, the Fed wanted to discourage Congress from adopting inflationary 
measures because the open market purchases of the previous year “had enabled Treasury to 
borrow cheaply and ‘so in some measure has encouraged the continuance of an unbalanced 
budget.’”116 Meanwhile, rumors that the dollar would be devalued, which stemmed from the 
administrative change, caused the demand for gold coins and certificates to increase. The Fed 
responded to this external drain by once again increasing discount and buying rates; however, 
because of an almost irrational fear of inflation, it did not purchase securities to offset the rate 
increase.117 This last move led to the Banking Failures of 1933. By March 1933, New York’s 
reserve percentage had decreased below the legal limit. Roosevelt declared a national banking 
holiday on March 6.118 However, more than a third of the banks did not open at all after the bank 
holiday finally ended almost ten days later. The general panic had permeated the System, which 
had been forced to shut down the reserve banks themselves because of its own failures.  
Though the Board took an increasing leadership role during this period, the lack of 
agreement within the Board prevented it from agreeing on a proper and timely course of action. 
New York directors favored expansionary policy and at times took actions without Board 
approval, but this only angered the OMPC and certain members of the Board and did not actually 
help because the System acted in a manner that would offset the expansion. All of these are 
consequences of the legitimacy the Board derived from the court decision, particularly the failure 
to coordinate with the fiscal policies of 1931-32. The Federal Reserve believed that it had no 
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responsibility to help the administration, another indication that it felt assured of its 
independence; such a strong stance could not have been taken without the implied judicial 
sanction from Raichle v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Furthermore, the Fed also only 
reluctantly went along with congressional policies when greatly pressured because it viewed 
Congress’s proposals as dangerous because of its short-termism. The Fed was ultimately 
obsessed with preventing inflation even as late as 1933, during the trough of the Great 
Depression when money supply had decreased by a third. Upholding its independence allowed it 
to act on this mistaken belief. 
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6.0  A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT  
Suppose the courts had found in favor of Raichle and required the Federal Reserve to discount 
bills for investment purposes. As mentioned earlier, the Federal Reserve’s policies were well 
enough underway in slowing down economic activity in the spring of 1929. Forcing the Federal 
Reserve to make more credit available would have funneled more money into the stock market, 
but it would also have revived flagging economic activity. However, this would have continued 
to the allow the bubble to grow, making the inevitable crash even more spectacular due to market 
forces. Where the change might have occurred would have been after the crash.  
When the crash did occur, the Federal Reserve would have been forced to continue its 
expansionary policy, which in such a situation is actually desirable because it mitigates a credit 
crunch. Moreover, the Federal Reserve would have also been forced to perform its job as the 
lender of last resort; one might have seen something similar to the bailouts of today because the 
hypothetical ruling could have concluded that the Federal Reserve should continue to rediscount 
loans even if they had the stock market shares as collateral.119 Fewer banks would have failed, 
credit would have been available to kick the economy back into action, and the Great Depression 
might have been a mere blip in economic history.  Thus far, things sound good.  
However, Hand, in his opinion in Raichle, decisively concluded that the “remedy sought 
[in forcing the Federal Reserve to rediscount] would make the courts, rather than the Federal 
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Reserve Board, the supervisors of the Federal Reserve System, and would involve a cure worse 
than the malady.” Once the economy recovers from the recessions due to expansionary monetary 
policy, one can see what he probably meant by issuing the above statement. Continued 
expansionary policy, especially during periods of economic booms, leads to inflation. The 
Federal Reserve would, of course, find it necessary to tighten monetary policy, but with its 
power effectively undermined by the courts, the Federal Reserve would have been become 
extremely susceptible to political pressure and public outrage. Once it starts to decrease credit, 
one can expect a short-term increase in unemployment. The public would undoubtedly decry the 
Federal Reserve’s policies and bring the central bank to court because its actions are hurting the 
economy.120  
The courts, based on precedence and their lack of knowledge regarding monetary policy 
measures and their consequences, would most likely rule that the Federal Reserve should make 
money available. Though this would briefly alleviate the unemployment situation, inflation 
would continue to increase because the central bank is forced to print money. One might even 
expect a scenario like stagflation, or even worse hyperinflation, because if unemployment starts 
to rise, the temporary solution would be to continue printing money. By the time it becomes clear 
that this expansionary solution has stopped being effective, inflation would already be out of 
control.  
Even if Congress indirectly consents to tighter monetary policies, the number of cases 
filed against the Federal Reserve would increase tremendously, burdening and in turn paralyzing 
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the judiciary.121  The Federal Reserve would be unable to act speedily when necessary to correct 
situations, and monetary policy would essentially become ineffective.  As Hand further stated in 
Raichle: 
It would be an unthinkable burden upon any banking system if its open market sales and 
discount rates were subject to judicial review. Indeed, the correction of discount rates by 
judicial decree seems almost grotesque, when we remember that conditions in the money 
market often change from hour to hour, and the disease would ordinarily be over long 
before a judicial diagnosis could be made.122 
 
Though in the short run, a ruling in favor of the plaintiff might have prevented the magnitude of 
the Great Depression, the long-term consequences would have been disastrous. Not only would 
the Federal Reserve have been paralyzed, it would have been paralyzed with an inflationary bias 
because any time it made an unpleasant decision, someone would take the Federal Reserve to 
court, and the Federal Reserve would be forced to reverse its policy. Other consequences of a 
prolonged expansionary monetary policy also include more asset market bubbles and their 
inevitable crashes and downturns.  
The courts correctly ruled that the Federal Reserve should be allowed to conduct open 
market operations independently because to do otherwise would have substituted judicial for 
administrative judgment, which is not desirable for monetary policy. Unfortunately, this decision 
came at a time when market sentiments were unhealthy and most likely precipitated the stock 
market crash. The courts preserved the Federal Reserve’s independence, but this resulted in the 
grossest mismanagement of policy in the 1930s. Though an independent central bank should be 
                                                
121 If the protests staged in 1982 against Volcker’s Federal Reserve, is any indication of the public displeasure, one 
would expect the public to take action via the judiciary since that option would be available under this hypothetical 
ruling. 
122 Raichle v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 34 F.2d 910 (1929). 
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able to take unpleasant decisions in face of public outrage, the following section examines how 
Raichle paradoxically led to the opposite in the case of the Federal Reserve. 
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7.0  THE DEARTH OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE IN THE U.S. 
The Federal Reserve Act, as it stands today, is ambiguous in determining a policy goal for the 
Federal Reserve. It is called upon to:  
maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates…so as to 
promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and 
moderate long-term interest rates. The Chairman of the Board shall appear before 
the Congress [semi-annually]…regarding the efforts, activities, objectives and 
plans…with respect to the conduct of monetary policy….123  
 
The various objectives of the central bank are also somewhat conflicting, which was very much 
apparent during the stagflation of 1970s and 1980s. The ambiguity gives the central bank 
considerable goal independence and room to maneuver because the Fed has the ability to adapt 
and tailor its policies to a given situation. However, the semi-annual appearances of the 
Chairman before Congress to discuss objectives and implementation suggest that this 
“independence” comes with a caveat. These appearances diminish policy independence 
considerably because the government has the ability to influence and dictate the policy of the 
Federal Reserve in these meetings. Nevertheless, the central bank ultimately decides the policy; 
according to the law, it does not need a stamp of approval from Congress or the public. 
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Depending on the strength and determination of the chairmen, the Federal Reserve has the ability 
to oppose Congress.124  
  Regarding management, the Federal Reserve has considerable independence, but there 
again exists room for government influence. The President appoints seven members to the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve for 14-year terms,125 which implies strong management 
independence. It is also free of the congressional budget process and selects its own staff, further 
indications of its management independence. However, should certain powers of the Board 
overlap or conflict with the powers of the Treasury, the Treasury can supervise and control such 
powers of the Federal Reserve.126 This special relationship between the Treasury and the Fed 
makes it unclear exactly who is calling the shots in some situations. Thus, the Fed can mostly 
operate and conduct policy according to its own discretion, but the government has the ability to 
strongly influence its policies.  
Economists classify the Fed as quasi or mostly independent. Alesina and Summers 
evaluated central bank independence and average inflation in their 1993 paper; the graph on the 
following page is a summary of their findings.127 The Federal Reserve’s goal and operation 
independence from a technical perspective affords it tremendous independence, which is 
reflected in Alesina and Summers’ high evaluation.128 However, compared to other central 
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banks, the Federal Reserve has been only as successful in curbing inflation as some of its less 
independent counterparts such as the Dutch or Belgian central bank. This finding has two 
possible interpretations: either the Federal Reserve isn’t as inflation averse as other independent 
central banks, or the Federal Reserve is not as independent as currently perceived.  
 
Figure 2: Central Bank Independence and Average Inflation (from 
Alesina and Summers  [1993]) 
 
 
Evidence from history shows that the latter is likely the case; the Federal Reserve 
prioritizes between unemployment and inflation based on public sentiment and political pressure. 
The vague mandate in reality detracts from the Federal Reserve’s ability to make independent 
policy because the Board takes its cues from public sentiment. Moreover, the history of distrust 
and contempt the American public holds for its central bank further constrains the Federal 
Reserve’s independence because unpopular policy usually results in rumblings of the Federal 
Reserve’s constitutionality and congressional inquiries. This causes the Federal Reserve to give 
in to the political pressure in order to preserve its independence. A truly independent central 
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bank would be willing to make unpopular policy decisions despite public outrage, but the 
Federal Reserve shows hesitation in making unpopular policy, which after the Great Depression 
has been characterized by a reluctance to raise interest rates following recessions.  
Before the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve was single-mindedly preoccupied with 
inflation and price stability; though one of the policy goals in the 1920s was a return to the gold 
standard, the System refused to follow gold standard rules if it meant allowing inflation to rise.129 
It made many blunders because of this obsession with avoiding inflation, which undoubtedly 
resulted in the Great Depression. However, following the Great Depression mitigating 
unemployment and recessions became the major policy concern, until the Paul Volcker took over 
the Board. The negative growth and high unemployment during the Great Depression caused an 
aversion within the nation for high unemployment. This in turn influenced the Federal Reserve’s 
preferences, especially since many of the consequences of the Great Depression were a result of 
the Federal Reserve’s policies.  
In 1951, the Federal Reserve returned to independent policy-making after a prolonged 
hiatus.130 Initially, the Federal Reserve showed a preference for price stability and low inflation; 
Martin, the Federal Reserve Chairman, made statements worthy of the Bundesbank, known for 
its tough stance against inflation.131 Figure 3 (on page 51), which is a closer snapshot of historic 
inflation, shows that post-war inflation was once again a problem in the late 1940s and early 
1950s. When contrasted with Figure 4 (on page 52), which shows logged values of real GDP 
since 1900, one can see why inflation rather than economic growth was the focal point; the 
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economy had boomed during the war, but post-war disinflation policies had to be pursued. This 
suggests that inflation aversion was probably not an unpopular policy stance at this point, 
particularly because the Federal Reserve was trying to establish its independence following 
almost two decades of inaction and subservience.  
 
 
Figure 3: Inflation Rates in the U.S. from 1900 to present 
 
However, in the 1960s, policy preferences once again shifted to promoting full 
employment. Though Martin still presided over the Federal Reserve, he believed that fiscal and 
monetary policy should be coordinated, and the Federal Reserve had a responsibility to finance 
the government’s budget deficits. According to Martin, the Federal Reserve was “independent 
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within the government, not independent of the government [emphasis added].”132  He willingly 
accepted that the Federal Reserve’s independence should be curbed, but this does not fully 
explain his willingness to forgo his firm beliefs that inflation would not benefit unemployment in 
the long run.133  
 
 
Figure 4: Real GDP in the U.S. from 1900 to present (logged) 
 
A flurry of congressional activity began in 1960s in response to some Federal Reserve 
policies that caused high interest rates. In the mid-1960s, Congressional hearings on high interest 
rates at thrifts and small banks caused the Federal Reserve to once again look for ways to control 
                                                
132 Meltzer, Allan. “History of the Federal Reserve.” Lecture. Porter Hall, Carnegie Mellon University. Pittsburgh, 
PA. 4 April 2010.  
133 Romer and Romer (2004), p. 137. Footnote 3 
5.5	  5.7	  
5.9	  6.1	  
6.3	  6.5	  
6.7	  6.9	  
7.1	  
1900	   1910	   1920	   1930	   1940	   1950	   1960	   1970	   1980	   1990	   2000	   2010	  
Re
al
	  G
D
P	  
(l
og
	  v
al
ue
s)
	  
Year	  
US	  Real	  GDP	  (1900	  to	  2010)	  
   53 
inflation without raising rates at these banks.134 During this period, the Treasury also lobbied 
Board members not to increase discount rates, and the Federal Reserve complied.135 In 1967, the 
House Banking Committee sought to establish ceilings on market interest rates, subjugating 
higher rates to presidential approval; though the bill failed in the Senate, this once again 
threatened the Federal Reserve’s independence. This period is particularly reminiscent of the 
1920s, but with one main difference: the political backlash to higher rates in the 1960s caused 
the Federal Reserve to ignore rising inflation for budget deficit financing and supporting full 
employment.   
Nevertheless, Martin increased interest rates in late 1968, and the economy entered a 
recession by the end of 1969.136 Inflation continued to be high for peacetime. The Federal 
Reserve’s challenge in 1970 was to maintain the high interest rate to curb inflationary 
expectations. However, the regime change in 1970 highlights the Board’s reluctance to further 
increase interest rates or even maintain high rates due to fear of political reprisal. Within the first 
two months of his tenure, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which replaced the 
OMIC and OMPC, loosened policy considerably because unemployment had exceeded 5%. 
They believed that inflationary expectations had abated.137 However, when inflation failed to fall 
as they expected, the administration concluded that monetary policy couldn’t really arrest 
inflation.138 
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Burns did not even attempt to make uphold the central bank’s independence; he met 
numerous times with President Nixon to discuss policy.139 Romer and Romer find that the Burns 
administration initially could not tolerate even modest increases in unemployment because 
aggregate restraint could no longer effectively curb inflation. Between 1971 and 1973 
unemployment fell steadily; 1972 was election year, and Nixon’s belief that no election has been 
lost due to inflation caused the Board to further facilitate his campaign by expanding policy.140 In 
1974, the Fed once again adopted a tight policy and called upon the people to “tolerate a slower 
rate of economic growth and a higher rate of unemployment than any of us would like.”141 
During Burns’ tenure, the Fed also stated its intention of conducting monetary policy by using 
monetary targeting. However, it continued to place more importance on smoothing interest rates 
and reducing unemployment.142 The Fed was less inclined to constrain money supply, as 
evidenced by the accelerating money supply between 1970 and 1980 in spite of monetary targets 
set by the Federal Reserve.  
Miller followed Burns in 1978, and he only held office for 17 months. During Miller’s 
brief tenure unemployment rates fell and inflation surged because of the belief that 
unemployment rates were above the natural rate of unemployment. The Fed was also fairly 
passive under Miller. Interestingly, in 1978 Congress passed the Humphrey-Hawkins bill, which 
increased congressional oversight of the Federal Reserve considerably.143 The Chairman was 
required to meet more regularly with Congress to discuss strategies and the Federal Reserve’s 
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performance in adhering to monetary aggregate targets. Though the Act itself was called the 
“Full Employment Act,” it specifically mandated the Federal Reserve to curb inflation. This 
change in the political climate reflects public opinion; during the late 1970s, polls showed that 
the public found inflation to be the most important domestic problem.144  
In 1979, Paul Volcker became the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, after Carter 
expressly stated that he wanted someone who would fight inflation.145 He was a strong 
“monetarist” chairman who did not hesitate in increasing interest rates. However, due to the 
Humphrey-Hawkins bill, the Federal Reserve wasn’t as independent as one generally believes of 
the Volcker era. Indeed, in early 1980, Carter requested Volcker to use credit controls rather than 
higher interest rates, and Volcker reluctantly agreed to do so (he had no choice). However, in this 
instance, the public signalled that it wanted lower inflation by mailing cut-up credit cards to 
Congress and the Federal Reserve and reducing loans.146 Credit controls ended because the 
public decisively showed its displeasure with the high inflation; for the first time, a President lost 
the re-election due to inflation. Ronald Reagan supported Volcker’s anti-inflationary policies. 
However, this public bravado did not last. As Volcker continued the unpopular hike in 
interest rates into the double digits, the economic reality and hardships led to protests against  
theFed’s policies.147 Volcker even met with protesters a couple of time to placate the indignant 
masses regarding the “tyrannical” Fed.148 Congress once again attempted to pass bills that would 
force the Federal Reserve to lower rates and undermine its independence.149 Fortunately, oil 
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prices started declining steadily from 1983, removing some of the inflationary pressures; this 
allowed the Fed to ease the restrictive monetary policy and remove threats on its independence.  
One can conclude from these occurrences that the Federal Reserve was only able to 
combat inflation because it initially had public backing, and when that failed, it had a strong 
Chairman. The congressional oversight and public support lent Volcker legitimacy, at least for 
the first two years, because the Federal Reserve was merely acting in accordance with the wishes 
of the people. The actions taken by Volcker when many factions of the public were outraged 
indicates that the Fed did not bow to political pressures due to a strong Chairman who believed 
in the Federal Reserve’s independence. Volcker also had Reagan’s backing, which helped.  
Following these drastic policies that finally brought inflation under control, the US 
entered the period of Great Moderation under Greenspan, when the Federal Reserve flourished. 
Inflation was low, policy was mostly counter-cyclical, and the economic growth was mostly 
smooth. However, following the dot-com crash and subsequent recession, it is widely contended 
that the Fed held interest rates too low for too long, which caused, or at the very least, worsened 
the bubble in the housing market. Though Greenspan has denied that his policy of “too” low 
interest rates was to blame for the bubble, the popular sentiment that the Federal Reserve made a 
blunder begs an explanation for its policy.150 
 The answer for the Federal Reserve’s policy during this period is once again political 
pressure. In 2003, the US entered the war against Iraq; though Bush took over from a Clinton era 
that was running budget surpluses, by this time, the government had once again started running 
deficits, which put a downward pressure on interest rates. In 2003 Congress also signed the 
American Dream Downpayment Initiative (ADDI) into law, which sought to increase 
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homeownership rate, especially among low income and minority groups.151 Thus, the political 
environment during this time called for easy money because of expansion in fiscal policy; readily 
enough the Fed made it available. This explanation for the Fed’s error in holding interest rates 
too low in the 2000s is in line with its past tendencies to bow under political pressure.  
From these sketches of the Federal Reserve’s operations following World War II, the 
Federal Reserve does not appear as independent as it is given credit for. Whether the Fed 
believed it should not be very independent, or implicitly complied with the President and 
Congress, or derived its legitimacy from public support, history shows that the Fed’s policy 
preferences take on lexicographic ordering between inflation and unemployment based on public 
and political sentiments. A strong Chairman, like Volcker, was able to break out of this pattern 
briefly and administer the medicine the people needed but refused to take; though his method 
worked, his policy resulted in public outcries regarding the Fed’s constitutionality, which could 
have had serious consequences had he not been able to reduce rates in 1982 as he was so 
fortuitously able to do. Greenspan’s record up until early 2000 was impeccable, suggesting he 
was another strong Chairman, but when his administration faced serious recession and rising 
unemployment, he succumbed to political pressures.  
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8.0  CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, central banks should be independent, especially of judiciary oversight because “the 
experience of the Board of Governors, to whom Congress has committed the supervision of this 
complex system, gives them an advantage which judges cannot have in dealing with the 
congeries of imponderables involved in questions of banking policy.”152 A private citizen 
questioned the Federal Reserve’s authority to detect and deflate bubbles, and the courts 
confirmed that the Federal Reserve could set policy as it sees fit. However, after its disastrous 
attempt at monitoring the soundness of credit in the 1920s, the Federal Reserve never again 
attempted to starve the stock market. 
Today, stock market manias and crashes continued to occur more frequently, and with 
greater impact on the real economy. Successive asset bubbles are unsurprising and should 
actually be expected, especially if the Federal Reserve really does have a tendency to hold 
interest rates too low for too long. After all, the dotcom bubble and crash that occurred in early 
2000 gave way to the housing bubble in a few short years and another crash before the end of the 
decade. To address this problem, proposals regarding Federal Reserve operations are once again 
on the congressional floor. Some propose to give the Federal Reserve more powers, especially in 
a regulatory capacity, so that it can prevent financial markets from excessive risk-taking. There 
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are even proposals that call upon the Federal Reserve to detect asset price bubbles and deflate 
them instead of letting them run their course.153 Unless the independence deficiency outlined 
here is addressed, such proposals will not be effective because the Federal Reserve continues to 
be constrained by fears. 
 The Fed’s tendency to give in to public and political wishes was apparent from the 
beginning of its establishment. The courts upholding the System’s right to make independent 
policy in Raichle was a shining moment that allowed it to stop fearing political recrimination, but 
this proved to be more of a curse than a boon because the legitimacy the Federal Reserve derived 
from this case unfortunately led to serious errors on the System’s part that resulted in the Great 
Depression. The psychological impact of this tremendous event on the public and the Federal 
Reserve is undeniable. It is now prone to err on the side of easing recession conditions than on 
preventing inflation (unless the public demands otherwise). In other words, the Federal Reserve 
is more concerned with short-term than medium term consequences.  
The current administration’s actions are very much in line with these claims. Bernanke 
acted in unprecedented ways to prevent the economy from plunging into another Great 
Depression, but this was done are undertaking fiscal policy actions in taking on mortgage-backed 
securities (guaranteed by government agencies such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) as assets. 
Ironically, in 1932 when Congress urged the Board to similarly assist the housing and mortgage 
market, the Board refused. This is another example of how the Board was more independent in 
the three years following the court ruling in 1929 than it is today. The actions following the 
financial crisis in 2008 were clearly taken with a short-term view.  
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Policy for the future is a little more worrisome. It is unclear how the Fed will remove the 
toxic assets from its balance book. Bernanke has also flushed the system with a tremendous 
amount of credit without a proper exit strategy; when it becomes profitable for banks to lend the 
money sitting in their reserves, they will do so. The budget deficit projections for the future 
indicate further pressure the Fed to finance fiscal policy by essentially printing money. All of 
these indicate inflationary pressures down the road. It remains to be seen how the public and the 
Federal Reserve act in the coming years when high unemployment and high inflation could once 
again be a major problem. The following observation made by Volcker in 1980 will prove to be 
particularly useful for future-policy making under the current mandate for the Federal Reserve: 
In the past, at critical junctures for economic stabilization policy, we have usually 
been more preoccupied with the possibility of near-term weakness in economic 
activity or other objectives than with the implication of our actions for future 
inflation… The result has been our now chronic inflationary problem…. Success 
[in breaking this pattern] will require that policy be consistently and persistently 
oriented to that end. Vacillation and procrastination, out of fears of recession or 
otherwise, would run grave risks.154 [emphasis added]. 
 
Regardless of how the Federal Reserve digs itself out of its current hole, changes need to 
be made that will address the independence deficiency in the Federal Reserve. One possible 
solution that Meltzer proposes is to require the Federal Reserve to choose policy targets based on 
some predetermined rule like the Taylor rule with the political officials; this would constrain 
political influence because Congress could ask Chairmen to render their resignation if they fail to 
meet the targets.155 However, this might not address the underlying problem behind the Federal 
Reserve’s tendency to give in to popular opinion: public recrimination and the people’s lack of 
confidence in the Federal Reserve’s ability to take the right course of action.  
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Meltzer offers the explanation that “in periods of stress and public discomfort, Congress, 
the administration or both offer the Federal Reserve and others increased scrutiny and 
direction.”156 This comes from a public that questions the Federal Reserve’s existence and 
constitutionality during difficult times. The Fed is not afforded the same respect as central banks 
in other developed nations and is held in down right contempt at times. During the Great 
Moderation, the Fed commanded the most admiration under the stewardship of Greenspan, but 
the recent crisis has once again eroded its respectability. The Fed’s policy in preventing another 
major depression in 2008 did not have popular support. The public was outraged by what it 
viewed as the privatization of profits and socialization of losses when the too-big-to-fail banks 
were rescued with taxpayer dollars. Rumblings of the Fed’s constitutionality have once again 
emerged. If the Fed gets through this crisis and its consequences without major blunders, its 
credibility will grow, but only until the next crisis. Thus, a solution must be found to increase the 
Federal Reserve’s image in American society.  
The European Central Bank (ECB) is tremendously independent its independence is 
immortalized in the Treaty of Maastricht, which cannot be easily amended. The German people 
revered the Bundesbank, and German politicians would rarely comment on the central bank’s 
policy. The kind of Congressional inquiries seen in the United States would have never taken 
place in Germany, and they won’t take place now in the European Union over the ECB’s 
policies. Perhaps this means that the Federal Reserve’s powers should be similarly immortalized 
in the US Constitution to safeguard its independence, but one can never see that happening given 
its track record. The other solution is to completely alter the Federal Reserve’s mandate and 
make price stability its main concern; numerous central banks of developed countries were 
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restructured to follow this model in the 1990s including the Bank of England and the Reserve 
Bank of Australia. However, it is not clear if such a plan would work in the United States.  
Federal agencies are given independence and are slightly removed from political pressure 
in order to prevent time inconsistency in preferences. The Utility companies face pressure to 
deliver low rates because people are not as concerned about upkeep expenses since they might 
not be around to experience the benefits. Central banking is another such “industry” that faces 
time inconsistency pressure. When the Fed’s independence was upheld, it allowed the biggest 
catastrophe in U.S. economic history to occur. Now, it appears to face the same time 
inconsistency pressures as the constituents because it is not as independent as perceived. 
Therefore, something must be done to address the central bank’s susceptibility to political 
pressures, especially because the Federal Reserve’s actions have global consequences. 
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APPENDIX A 
U.S. HISTORICAL INFLATION RATES (1790 – Present)
 
Year Inflation 
  
1790 3.75 
1791 2.71 
1792 1.87 
1793 3.45 
1794 10.95 
1795 14.38 
1796 5.26 
1797 -3.75 
1798 -3.33 
1799 0 
1800 2.1 
1801 1.31 
1802 -15.73 
1803 5.49 
1804 4.38 
1805 -0.7 
1806 4.23 
1807 -5.41 
1808 8.66 
1809 -2.05 
1810 0 
1811 6.8 
1812 1.26 
1813 20.02 
1814 9.89 
1815 -12.29 
1816 -8.65 
1817 -5.36 
1818 -4.34 
1819 0 
 
 
 
1820 -7.87 
1821 -3.52 
1822 3.65 
1823 -10.65 
1824 -7.88 
1825 2.57 
1826 0 
1827 0.83 
1828 -4.96 
1829 -1.85 
1830 -0.89 
1831 -6.26 
1832 -0.95 
1833 -1.93 
1834 1.97 
1835 2.89 
1836 5.62 
1837 2.77 
1838 -2.7 
1839 0 
1840 -7.1 
1841 0.95 
1842 -6.62 
1843 -9.24 
1844 1.12 
1845 1.1 
1846 1.09 
1847 7.69 
1848 -4.14 
1849 -3.14 
 
 
 
1850 2.16 
1851 -2.11 
1852 1.08 
1853 0 
1854 8.68 
1855 2.95 
1856 -1.91 
1857 2.92 
1858 -5.67 
1859 1 
1860 0 
1861 5.96 
1862 14.17 
1863 24.82 
1864 25.14 
1865 3.68 
1866 -2.53 
1867 -6.82 
1868 -3.91 
1869 -4.14 
1870 -4.24 
1871 -6.4 
1872 0 
1873 -2.03 
1874 -4.83 
1875 -3.62 
1876 -2.35 
1877 -2.31 
1878 -4.73 
1879 0 
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1880 2.48 
1881 0 
1882 0 
1883 -2.02 
1884 -2.06 
1885 -2 
1886 -2.15 
1887 1.1 
1888 0 
1889 -3.25 
1890 -1.12 
1891 0 
1892 0 
1893 -1.13 
1894 -4.36 
1895 -2.4 
1896 0 
1897 -1.23 
1898 0 
1899 0 
1900 1.24 
1901 1.23 
1902 1.21 
1903 2.28 
1904 1.17 
1905 -1.16 
1906 2.23 
1907 4.47 
1908 -2.09 
1909 -1.12 
1910 4.42 
1911 0 
1912 2.06 
1913 2.13 
1914 0.94 
1915 0.52 
1916 9.24 
1917 20.49 
1918 17.47 
1919 14.87 
1920 15.84 
1921 -10.68 
1922 -6.31 
1923 1.79 
1924 0.18 
1925 2.51 
1926 0.97 
1927 -1.86 
1928 -1.38 
1929 0 
1930 -2.51 
1931 -8.8 
1932 -10.31 
1933 -5.12 
1934 3.32 
1935 2.54 
1936 0.95 
1937 3.61 
1938 -1.88 
1939 -1.42 
1940 1.01 
1941 4.99 
1942 10.66 
1943 6.13 
1944 1.73 
1945 2.27 
1946 8.56 
1947 14.33 
1948 7.79 
1949 -0.96 
1950 0.96 
1951 7.89 
1952 2.19 
1953 0.75 
1954 0.49 
1955 -0.37 
1956 1.49 
1957 3.57 
1958 2.74 
1959 0.83 
1960 1.58 
1961 1.01 
1962 1.14 
1963 1.19 
1964 1.34 
1965 1.71 
1966 2.85 
1967 2.9 
1968 4.19 
1969 5.37 
1970 5.92 
1971 4.3 
1972 3.31 
1973 6.21 
1974 10.98 
1975 9.14 
1976 5.76 
1977 6.45 
1978 7.61 
1979 11.27 
1980 13.52 
1981 10.38 
1982 6.13 
1983 3.21 
1984 4.32 
1985 3.56 
1986 1.86 
1987 3.65 
1988 4.14 
1989 4.82 
1990 5.4 
1991 4.21 
1992 3.01 
1993 2.99 
1994 2.56 
1995 2.83 
1996 2.95 
1997 2.29 
1998 1.56 
1999 2.21 
2000 3.36 
2001 2.85 
2002 1.58 
2003 2.28 
2004 2.66 
2005 3.39 
2006 3.23 
2007 2.85 
2008 3.84 
2009 -0.36 
2010 1.64 
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Graph: Historical Inflation Rates in the U.S. from 1790 to Present
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APPENDIX B 
U.S. HISTORICAL REAL GDP (in millions of 2005 dollars) 
 
Year Real GDP 
  
1790 4,027 
1791 4,268 
1792 4,583 
1793 4,947 
1794 5,601 
1795 5,956 
1796 6,146 
1797 6,269 
1798 6,538 
1799 7,000 
1800 7,398 
1801 7,759 
1802 8,003 
1803 8,139 
1804 8,455 
1805 8,903 
1806 9,323 
1807 9,332 
1808 9,353 
1809 10,068 
1810 10,626 
1811 11,109 
1812 11,553 
1813 12,210 
1814 12,721 
1815 12,823 
1816 12,822 
1817 13,120 
1818 13,597 
1819 13,860 
 
 
 
1820 14,414 
1821 15,181 
1822 15,757 
1823 16,327 
1824 17,295 
1825 18,069 
1826 18,711 
1827 19,292 
1828 19,552 
1829 20,296 
1830 22,162 
1831 23,992 
1832 25,613 
1833 26,402 
1834 26,846 
1835 28,270 
1836 29,107 
1837 29,374 
1838 30,589 
1839 31,375 
1840 31,461 
1841 32,166 
1842 33,194 
1843 34,839 
1844 36,818 
1845 39,148 
1846 42,330 
1847 45,211 
1848 46,735 
1849 47,384 
 
 
 
1850 49,586 
1851 53,577 
1852 59,764 
1853 64,651 
1854 66,883 
1855 69,672 
1856 72,470 
1857 72,841 
1858 75,789 
1859 81,276 
1860 82,107 
1861 83,570 
1862 93,954 
1863 101,179 
1864 102,327 
1865 105,257 
1866 100,428 
1867 102,150 
1868 106,134 
1869 109,022 
1870 112,276 
1871 117,618 
1872 127,460 
1873 138,333 
1874 140,849 
1875 140,598 
1876 146,418 
1877 153,703 
1878 158,643 
1879 177,133 
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1880 191,814 
1881 215,798 
1882 227,250 
1883 233,535 
1884 229,685 
1885 230,480 
1886 249,225 
1887 267,331 
1888 282,701 
1889 290,824 
1890 319,077 
1891 322,850 
1892 339,301 
1893 319,606 
1894 304,458 
1895 339,247 
1896 333,642 
1897 348,023 
1898 386,074 
1899 412,475 
1900 422,843 
1901 445,287 
1902 468,159 
1903 481,821 
1904 464,761 
1905 517,201 
1906 538,350 
1907 552,184 
1908 492,484 
1909 528,081 
1910 533,767 
1911 551,061 
1912 576,879 
1913 599,651 
1914 553,739 
1915 568,835 
1916 647,713 
1917 631,693 
1918 688,666 
1919 694,191 
1920 687,704 
1921 671,938 
1922 709,250 
1923 802,640 
1924 827,355 
1925 846,789 
1926 902,122 
1927 910,834 
1928 921,273 
1929 977,000 
1930 892,800 
1931 834,900 
1932 725,800 
1933 716,400 
1934 794,400 
1935 865,000 
1936 977,900 
1937 1,028,000 
1938 992,600 
1939 1,072,800 
1940 1,166,900 
1941 1,366,100 
1942 1,618,200 
1943 1,883,100 
1944 2,035,200 
1945 2,012,400 
1946 1,792,200 
1947 1,776,100 
1948 1,854,200 
1949 1,844,700 
1950 2,006,000 
1951 2,161,100 
1952 2,243,900 
1953 2,347,200 
1954 2,332,400 
1955 2,500,300 
1956 2,549,700 
1957 2,601,100 
1958 2,577,600 
1959 2,762,500 
1960 2,830,900 
1961 2,896,900 
1962 3,072,400 
1963 3,206,700 
1964 3,392,300 
1965 3,610,100 
1966 3,845,300 
1967 3,942,500 
1968 4,133,400 
1969 4,261,800 
1970 4,269,900 
1971 4,413,300 
1972 4,647,700 
1973 4,917,000 
1974 4,889,900 
1975 4,879,500 
1976 5,141,300 
1977 5,377,700 
1978 5,677,600 
1979 5,855,000 
1980 5,839,000 
1981 5,987,200 
1982 5,870,900 
1983 6,136,200 
1984 6,577,100 
1985 6,849,300 
1986 7,086,500 
1987 7,313,300 
1988 7,613,900 
1989 7,885,900 
1990 8,033,900 
1991 8,015,100 
1992 8,287,100 
1993 8,523,400 
1994 8,870,700 
1995 9,093,700 
1996 9,433,900 
1997 9,854,300 
1998 10,283,500 
1999 10,779,800 
2000 11,226,000 
2001 11,347,200 
2002 11,553,000 
2003 11,840,700 
2004 12,263,800 
2005 12,638,400 
2006 12,976,200 
2007 13,228,900 
2008 13,228,800 
2009 12,880,600 
2010 13,248,200 
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